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Unrelated to Serving Their Customers. Can This Be an Effective Regulatory
Response to Risk Issues Exposed During the Financial Crisis that Commenced
in the Autumn of 2008?

Abstract: The financial crisis revealed the extent of the global financial system’s
interconnectedness. Regulators are challenged to find new means of identifying and tackling
sources of risk. A regulatory focus on micro, rather than macro prudential (i.e. network‐
based), models may explain recent failures.
Some authors (Krahnen and Wilde), analysing risk management, conclude that it is
governments’ duty to provide insurance against a system‐wide crash. In contrast,
Battiston and others focus on increasing connectivity a nd ris k.
Representative agent models are applied to the financial system. But Colander and
Haldane have suggested that regulation must be extended from individual institutions to a
systemic perspective. Network analysis theorists, such as Barabasi, contend that the
implications of interactions between economic agents must be probed. They argue that a
sufficiently developed appreciation of connections between firms, households and a
dispersed banking sector is needed to understand risk. This will be contrasted with the
response of traditional regulatory theorists (including Goodhart), calling for greater capital
requirements and more stringent regulation.
Regulators must devise effective means of tracking systemic linkages. Network analysis
theories, focusing on interconnections between financial institutions, can provide valuable
tools to assess risk in the modern financial system.
The challenges posed by interconnectedness are most likely to endure. Hence the need to
assess whether a proposal, such as that contained in the “Volcker Rule”, is an adequate
response.
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Under the “Volcker Rule” in the United States, It Is
Proposed that Banks Will No Longer Be Allowed to
Own, Invest in, or Sponsor Hedge Funds, Private
Equity Funds, or Proprietary Trading Operations for
Their Own Profit, Unrelated to Serving Their
Customers. Can This Be an Effective Regulatory
Response to Risk Issues Exposed During the Financial
Crisis that Commenced in the Autumn of 2008?
Ted Harding*

I. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis that engulfed the international economy in late 2008 demonstrated how
a major shock to a financial market can have widespread negative consequences. One of the
main challenges facing regulators is the task of devising effective means of tracking systemic
linkages in the international financial services market. The scale of the financial devastation
entails that reform of the regulatory system is essential.
In the United States, under the Volcker financial reform proposals, supported by the Obama
administration, no bank or financial institution that contains a bank will own, invest in or
sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity fund, or proprietary trading operations unrelated
to serving customers for its own profit1.
An ancillary proposal would place broader restrictions on the excessive growth of the
market share of liabilities at the largest financial institutions. This would be intended to
supplement existing limits on the share of deposits2.
At the core of this paper is the conviction that effective, credible regulatory reform requires
a new assessment of the international financial system. The goal of this approach would be
the devising of remedial measures specific to the challenges presented by an ever‐evolving
and sophisticated market, rather than ones that simply react to issues as they present
themselves. Essentially, it advocates an holistic approach, based on an appraisal of the
*
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modern financial system. By focusing on micro, rather than macro prudential (i.e. network‐
based) models, the recent failures of regulators may have been inevitable. Traditional
regulatory models have tended to concentrate on individual institutions in the financial
system, rather than on the system itself. While an institution may appear financially sound,
based on its published accounts, it may, in fact, be very vulnerable to failure, due to its
relationship with other institutions in the system. Network analysis offers potential
remedies to this problem.
A network is a set of items, referred to as nodes, with connections between them. Systems
taking the form of networks are common. Examples include the World Wide Web, social
networks of acquaintances, or other connections between individuals, organisational
networks and networks of business relations between companies and many others3. This
paper takes the principles used in the analysis of networks and applies them to the
international financial services market.
The “Volcker Rule” is assessed in terms of whether it can be an effective regulatory
response to issues of risk exposed during the financial crisis that commenced in the autumn
of 2008.

II. THE SCALE OF THE CHALLENGE FACING REGULATORS
First it is necessary to assess the scale and nature of the problem confronting governments
and regulators. At the heart of the measures advanced to remediate the failings of the
international financial system is the need to tackle the problem of “moral hazard” that
manifested itself in such menacing form during the financial crisis. There has been a long‐
established “safety net” underpinning the operations of commercial banks. Generally this
takes the form of deposit insurance and lender of last resort facilities. However, as Volcker
has noted4, the concept of institutions being “too big to fail” remains highly problematic and
in need of effective policy responses. The idea that “...very large, complex and highly
interconnected financial institutions can count on public support at critical times”5 provokes
public anger at such unfairness. The provision of a public “back‐stop” for irresponsible risks
taken by banks and other financial institutions leads to what might be called the
“socialisation of losses”.

3

A graphic illustration of a simple network appears in the Appendix to the paper.
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III. “TRADITIONAL” REGULATORY RESPONSES AND REACTIONS TO FINANCIAL
FAILURES
In response to the crisis, many of the policy prescriptions urged on governments and
regulators have taken a traditional, conventional approach towards financial institutions.
Given the severe depletion of banks’ capital reserves, a focus upon strengthening bank
capital requirements was predictable. Policymakers were encouraged not just to
concentrate on making capital adequacy obligations contra‐cyclical, but to correlate them
with the movements in bank lending and asset prices in specific sectors. Prior to the markets
turmoil, Goodhart and Persaud6 were among those who advocated reforms to banks’ capital
adequacy levels. According to them, it would be possible to introduce “...these contra‐
cyclical measures to the new framework of banking regulation, under the umbrella of pillar
2 of Basel II (dealing with the supervisory review process).”7
More recently, commenting on the proposed Volcker reforms, Sinn8 argued that a return of
the Glass‐Steagall Act, as urged by some US policymakers to minimise risk in financial
markets, would be an ineffective response. Sinn argued that, unlike the US, Europe has a
“universal banking system” and a separation of commercial and investment banking would
destroy the European banking world. Hence, he advocated concentration upon the
strengthening of banks’ capital reserves. The approach of central banks around the world
was typified by that of Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, who has been
prominent among those calling for reform that would result in state support being limited to
retail, or utility banking9.
Following the crisis, there have been attempts by various prominent financial services sector
executives to thwart sweeping regulatory reform of the financial system. In April 2009, Lloyd
Blankfein, chairman and chief executive of Goldman Sachs, argued against measures he
considered threatening to the future of financial innovation and urged governments to
“...resist a response that is solely designed to protect us against the 100‐year storm”10.
There are compelling grounds, however, for challenging the characterisation of the recent
markets turmoil as a once‐in‐a‐century event. Economic and markets crises are not rarities
6
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and analysis of previous upheavals is not in short supply. The work of Bagehot11 and
Kindleberger12, to name but two, provides prominent examples. In the nineteenth and
twentieth century, the United States suffered a number of panics and depressions that
devastated personal wealth and led to high unemployment. A sub‐prime financial system,
rather than sub‐prime mortgage lending, is perhaps the real source of the latest turmoil.
Roubini is among those who identify warped compensation structures and corrupt ratings
agencies as sources of the malaise whereby the global financial system “...rotted from the
inside out”13.

IV. NOT A UNIQUE CRISIS?
Reinhart and Rogoff14 contend, however, that the current financial crisis differs little from a
series of similar past crises. Yet, as Colander et al15 note, “... the received body of models in
macro finance...provides no room whatsoever for such recurrent boom and bust cycles.”16
The failure to identify the threats to the international financial system before the events of
late 2008 is striking. In their analysis of the risk management implications of CDOs, Krahnen
and Wilde17 identified what they considered to be a possible increase of ‘systemic risk’.
However, their reaction to this prospect is telling. The authors conclude that the threat from
increased risk ought not to be the preoccupation of the institutions engaged in the CDO
market, but the obligation should be on governments to provide costless insurance against a
crash that could devastate the entire system.
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V. “BLACK SWANS” AND INTERCONNECTIONS IN THE MODERN FINANCIAL
SYSTEM
The suggested policy responses referenced above seem to derive from an economic
approach that appears not to take full account of the extent to which international financial
markets are interconnected and the potential problems arising in one part of the world to
have massive repercussions elsewhere. Evidence from the markets for Credit Default Swaps
(CDSs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) shows how the default of one
counterparty can place huge strain on the entire system. This is an example of a high‐impact
event that is difficult to predict, but to which the financial system is very vulnerable. Such
“Black Swan” events, as identified by Taleb18, can pose a major threat to financial stability.
On examining the relationship between flawed models of the economy and regulatory
failure, regulators are challenged to find new means of identifying and tackling sources of
risk.
It may be questioned whether the policy choices recommended by those who do not appear
to have challenged their pre‐crisis view of the economic system ought to be adopted
without thorough‐going scrutiny, let alone with alacrity. In order to obtain new assessments
of financial fragility, Colander et al recommend that the supervisory authorities develop a
“...perspective on the network aspects of the financial system, collect appropriate data,
define measures of connectivity and perform macro stress testing at system level”19. The
logical progression of such an argument is that the threat posed by systemic risk entails that
regulatory responses must move from a micro approach to a system‐wide regime of
regulation. It is a feature of financial institutions’ activities that they engage in “regulatory
arbitrage”, by relocating their operations from tightly‐regulated markets to less well‐
regulated ones. Rather than simply seeking to tackle problems that have manifested
themselves, there is an overwhelming case for first probing the system that produced such
disastrous events and, following analysis, prescribing reform measures. Indeed for those
who regard Volcker’s reform measures as a credible response, it should be noted he has
conceded that proprietary trading by banks was not central to the financial crisis – the very
argument used by some critics of his proposed ban on such activity20.

VI. THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO LINKAGES AND THE ASSESSMENT OF RISK
The central theme of this paper is that a different approach is required if policy prescriptions
(be they the proposed Volcker reforms, or others) are to be devised that are capable of
aiding authorities seeking to regulate the operations of a highly sophisticated, global and
interconnected market for financial services. Linkages between institutions and the
18
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entwining of markets give the international financial system characteristics of a living
organism or ecosystem. Technological change and the easing of regulatory controls in the
1990s facilitated the evolution of new and diverse financial products. This created an
enduring challenge for regulators, as they seek to apply rules to products that were not
even conceived of when the current governance regimes were put in place. The nature of
the contemporary financial market, therefore, calls for an approach to regulation that is
holistic and multi‐disciplinary.
A regulatory focus on micro, rather than macro prudential (i.e. network‐based), models may
explain recent regulatory failures. The work of Erdos and Renyi21 on the random graph was
one of the earliest theoretical models of a network. Subsequently this has been applied to
various scenarios in economics and the social sciences in a multi‐disciplinary approach.
Newman22 has studied how shocks may be transmitted through networks. A case in point is
the manner in which contagious diseases may be transmitted through a network of nodes,
originating in a limited group of infected nodes.

V. NETWORK THEORY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO COMPLEX SYSTEMS
At the core of work by network theorists, of which Barabasi is perhaps the most prominent,
is the belief that there must be some organising principles governing the complex webs
around us23. Essential to his work has been the study of power laws – a pattern of
distribution in which large is rare and small is common. Barabasi employs power laws to
describe how wealth is distributed in society (large wealth is rare, small wealth is common),
hence the not uncommon observation that 20 per cent of people hold 80 per cent of the
wealth24. Discovering power laws in networks made them essential to understanding
complex systems. Barabasi found that the presence of power‐law distributions in networks
required hubs with a disproportionate abundance of links, the formation of which could not
have been random. He dubbed such new types of networks “scale free”, as there was no
typical number of links and, therefore, no scale25. Barabasi’s work suggests that scale‐free
networks are not vulnerable to failure. In collaboration with Albert and Jeong, he26
21
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demonstrated that error and attack tolerance is displayed only by certain groups of
networks, including the World Wide Web, social networks and cells. The ability of the nodes
to communicate is found to be unaffected even by high failure rates.
The price of the great resilience comes, however, in the form of fragility under attack. A
hierarchy of many small nodes is held together by a few large hubs. The nodes are defined
by financial institutions and the links are the interconnections between the institutions, as
Soramaki has noted27. Attack and remove the most connected nodes in any network and it
disintegrates. As Haldane has observed, interconnected networks exhibit a knife‐edge, or
tipping‐point, property. Up to a point, the connections act as a shock‐absorber. But beyond
a certain range, the interconnections may act as “shock‐amplifiers, not dampeners, as losses
cascade”28. Rather than acting as a mutual insurance mechanism, the system may lead to
mutual destruction. Therefore, ironically, scale‐free networks couple robustness against
failures with vulnerability to attack. The test for regulators is to identify when the system is
approaching the tipping point. This is as relevant to a regulator based in New York or
Singapore, as it is to one in Dublin.
According to Barabasi, the natural consequence of connectedness and interdependency in
the modern financial system is exposure to “...cascading financial failure”29. The
interdependency of the international financial community is such that no institution may
work alone. Extrapolating from Barabasi’s work and applying it to the financial services
market, it may be possible to foresee and limit future crises, if the macroeconomic
interdependencies of networks are understood. Even though the hubs of international
finance are based in particular jurisdictions, the activities carried on within them have huge
impacts outside the countries in which the hubs are located. Hence, in the recent financial
crisis, individual states were forced to introduce radical measures to rescue financial
institutions resident within their borders. Yet the transnational nature of such institutions’
operations makes a compelling case for the establishment of new, more powerful
international regulators. Just as publicly‐quoted banks are obliged to comply with the rules
of stock exchanges in countries other than their own residence, but in which they wish to
have a listing, there is no convincing reason why institutions with international operations
should not be amenable to the requirements of international regulators.

VI. GLOBALISATION AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS – THE THREAT
With the rapid pace of globalisation and financial integration the risk posed by
interconnectedness looms large. This is perhaps the most significant and troubling adverse
consequence associated with externalities present in the modern financial system.
27
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Awareness of the Too‐Connected‐to‐Fail (TCTF) problem leads, logically, to the question of
how to regulate TCTF banks and other institutions, ensuring that they are amenable to
modes of regulation that are internationally‐recognised and, crucially, enforceable in a
transnational context.
The malign potential of a “failure cascade” is derived from the idea that the failure of one
institution could prompt a cycle of failures befalling other entities in the same system. Such
a dark scenario is predicated upon inter‐institution exposure due to direct and indirect
connections between institutions. Linkages of this sort derive from balance sheet claims
that expose one institution to the default of other institutions. As Battiston et al have
observed, if a firm is “...pushed into bankruptcy, this can trigger a cascade process in which
bankruptcies generate more bankruptcies”30. The authors conclude that systemic risk can be
the “...the result of two factors: the size of the different possible cascades, and the
frequency by which the system visits the distribution of robustness that leads to such
cascades”31.
A cascade of failure could also result from a shared reliance on lines of credit that may be
cancelled swiftly and with a minimum of notice. This type of occurrence was very evident
during the recent “credit crunch”. The source of indirect linkages could be via the means of
derivatives contracts and securities, where the market values are linked to the collapse of
an institution which, at first glance, would appear to have little or no connection to those it
affects. Effective regulation and proper monitoring of risk in the system call for the
development of methods for the assessment of TCTF risk.
Chan‐Lau32 employed balance sheet network analysis to measure interconnectedness risk
from direct exposures across various banking systems, using data from advanced and
emerging market economies. His analysis suggests that the main sources of risk in the global
banking system are “...shocks that impair the solvency of banks based in the United States
and the United Kingdom”33. In the context of a need to find new means of assessing risk in a
highly interconnected system, Chan‐Lau’s work illustrates how the use of simple
methodology ‐ balance sheet –based network analysis ‐ may capture interconnectedness
and TCTF risk in domestic and international banking systems using only data that is available
on the public record.

30
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VII. COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE REDUX
In many respects, the complex interdependence of states identified by Keohane and Nye34
resonates with the reality of contemporary financial markets. Keohane and Nye argued that
the decline of military force as a policy tool of choice and the increase in economic and
other forms of interdependence ought to increase the probability of cooperation among
states. The potency of certain modern financial instruments (characterised as “weapons of
mass destruction” by financier Warren Buffett35) ought to create a similar impetus towards
cooperation. The notion of an institution being too‐big‐to‐regulate ought not to be given the
opportunity to become part of public consciousness. The bailout of financial institutions in
the past two years has demonstrated the vital role of the state, notwithstanding the roll‐
back of regulatory measures in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the scale and range of activities
engaged in by financial institutions leaves one in no doubt as to the limitations on the
capacity of even the largest states to provide effective regulation.
Following the bailing‐out of large financial institutions, such as AIG, the position of major
players in the CDS networks of insurance and reinsurance for the mitigation of credit risk
has bolstered belief in the idea that some institutions are, indeed, “too big to fail”. But as
Markose et al have observed36, perpetuating the fiction of non‐failure of such a financial
institution avoids an essential key credit event that may trigger a chain of obligations with
itself as the focal point and also as guarantor of major bank balance sheet items. The loss of
such items results in the banks being undercapitalised and menaced by potential insolvency.
The failure to maintain proper monitoring and regulation of the CDS market resulted not
only in the failure to contain the financial crisis within the constraints of the financial
system, but the cost of remedying the situation has cost (and will continue to cost)
taxpayers huge sums of money in bailouts.

VIII. EXTERNALITIES AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
The assessment of risk in the modern financial services market appears, in many ways,
evokes Coase’s work37 regarding the economic efficiency of an economic allocation or
outcome in the presence of externalities. However, Pigou38 and Hardin39 argued that
34
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marginal cost pricing at the level of an individual unit is ineffective for modelling economic
activities that have negative externalities. It may be the influence of such work that prompts
Markose et al to comment that a practical modelling tool, useful for delivering quantitative
analysis of systemic risks in the financial sector, remain elusive40.
As Haldane notes41, the assessment of risk in the financial markets entails not only knowing
one’s counterparty, but knowing one’s counterparty’s counterparty too. This phenomenon
gives rise to network externalities. A graphic illustration of such externalities, or contagions,
was the case of Lehman Brothers, whose failure had such seismic effects.
The speed at which information is transmitted in international commerce and the huge
profits to be gained from having access vital information before it becomes available to
business rivals highlights the importance of information asymmetries. Just as Hayek42
emphasised the value of knowledge in society, the importance of information as a
commodity has seldom been greater. A similar theme is apparent in the work of Markose et
al, where they observe that an “information gap” on gross inter‐institutional exposures,
cross‐market, cross‐currency and cross‐country linkages creates the potential for future
turmoil. They urge that all credit extensions should be electronically tagged, so that their
progress through the international financial system may be traced and the resulting
information made publicly‐available.

IX. REGULATION THAT IS NETWORK‐AWARE AND NETWORK‐BASED
Having a central clearing house for CDS contracts offers one potential solution to the risk
that such instruments pose. Any clearing house would require sufficient capital or liquidity
to counteract systemic risk. Concerns of this nature have led Markose et al (borrowing
terminology relating to the vaccination of disease carriers) to propose the creation of a
“...super‐spreader fund”43 which reflects the systemic risk posed by the network impacts of
key financial players in it.
Financier George Soros has also noted that while ordinary securities must be registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission in the US before they may be traded, “synthetic”
securities (such as CDOs and CDSs) ought to be similarly registered44. Fundamental to
Soros’s argument is the contention that it is the task of regulators to understand derivatives
39
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40
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and synthetic securities. They ought not to allow their creation if it is not possible to fully
evaluate the resulting systemic risks. Were derivatives traded on exchanges registered as a
class, it follows that specifically‐created derivatives would have to be registered individually,
with regulators being obliged to understand the risks involved. The very existence of such a
registration process would be time‐consuming, thus discouraging the use of over‐the‐
counter derivatives.

X. CONTAGIONS AND THE “ROBUST‐YET‐FRAGILE” SYSTEM
According to Haldane, the scale and interconnectivity of the international financial services
network has increased significantly over the past two decades.45 However the author notes
that the network has evolved into a “robust‐yet‐fragile” system, vulnerable to losses of
confidence in key financial hubs at crucial moments and with rapid transmission of
disturbance. Barabasi and Haldane46 cite the experience in tackling the spread of HIV/AIDS
as being relevant to the confronting threats in the international financial markets. In the
case of randomly‐distributed networks, targeted treatment is of limited utility. But in the
case of networks having “long tails”, (including finance), targeted vaccination programmes
seem to offer a more effective response to contagions and epidemics.
Gai and Kapadia have focused on the means by which losses may potentially spread via the
complex network of counterparty exposures following the default of a party47. The authors
follow the logic of the market’s operation by examining how the knock‐on effects on asset
prices at some institutions of such a default can force the writing‐down of asset values.
“Contagion due to the direct interlinkages of interbank claims and obligations may thus be
reinforced by direct contagion on the asset side of the balance sheet,”48 they note. A
criticism of the framework posited is that it may assume financial connections between
intermediaries are formed on a random basis and are static. This may result in modelling the
contagion process in a rather mechanical manner, as balance sheets and the size and
structure of interbank linkages remain constant as default spreads throughout the system. It
may be argued that, under conditions of “normality”, financial institutions are strong and
minor variations in their probability of default do not affect lending decisions on the
interbank market. However, the dramatic failures of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers
demonstrate that contagion may spread rapidly; giving banks little time to protect
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themselves before being impacted. An appreciation of the significant role played by linkages
is also evident in recent statements by the European Central Bank49.
The model developed by the authors addresses the issue of contagion in arbitrary financial
networks and seeks to address concerns about the widespread transmission of shocks in the
context of rapid financial globalisation and in the aftermath of a large‐scale, systemic
financial crisis. One of the ironies emerging from such research is that while a high level of
connectivity can diminish the likelihood of contagion, it may also accelerate the speed of its
transmission across the system when problems arise. The aggregation of shocks and the
presence of liquidity risk also increase the likelihood of contagion.
In common with the findings of other analysts, Gai and Kapadia’s work shows that the
financial systems may display tendencies towards being robust‐yet‐fragile. But, crucially, the
research demonstrates how apparently indistinguishable shocks may have vastly different
consequences. This may go some way to explain why the seeming resilience of the system
to significant shocks prior to the recent financial crisis was not a good indicator of future
robustness. For this reason (among others), those who suggest “solutions” to the problems
exposed during the financial crisis, without displaying that they have reconsidered the
manner in which they assess the system itself, must have their proposals subjected to the
most thorough, reaching and critical assessment.

XI. LINKAGES: THE GREAT UNKNOWN
The assessment of risk when the extent of the linkages between institutions is not known
presents one of the most important challenges to regulators. It would be of particular
interest to conduct analysis based upon the consequences flowing from the failure of a
particular financial institution, which would affect large and / or highly connected borrowers
in the interbank system. Such an exercise could be married with the approach adopted by
Chan‐Lau, whereby the actual balance sheets for the targeted banks could be used. It is
suggested that this approach could aid the development and maturing of a model of
contagion risk.
Conducting analysis on the basis of factors that characterise the modern banking system
may also yield a clearer picture of the risk confronting institutions. Nier et al have carried
out research using criteria such as net worth, the size of the interbank market, the degree of
connectivity and the concentration of the system50. However, it emerges that the number of
connections to the central node is hugely significant. The authors conclude that “...banking
systems that show a high degree of tiering, i.e. where there is a first tier of money‐centre
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banks and a second tier of smaller banks that depend on the first‐tier banks – are not
necessarily more fragile than more homogenous banking systems”51.

XII. “SHADOW‐BANKING”: IT HAS NOT GONE AWAY
For those who are yet to be convinced that a radically new approach is necessary in order to
assess the risks posed by the modern financial system and, therefore, to regulate it, the
impact of the “shadow banking” network provides further evidence of the need for change.
In order to evade the requirements of the Basel II regulations, prior to the crisis, the
leverage of financial institutions rose to levels that were unprecedented. The favoured
means by which the Basel II rules were circumvented was by the use of special investment
vehicles (SIVs). Typically SIVs were used to purchase loans and sell bonds that were sliced
and diced from them. Over time, as Tett has noted, financiers created a “...vast ‘shadow
banking’ system that was out of the sight of almost everybody outside the specialist credit
world”52. Indeed, as Krugman has written, the crisis “...for the most part, hasn’t involved
problems with deregulated institutions that took new risks. Instead, it has involved risks
taken by institutions that were never regulated in the first place”53. The consequences of
financial devastation wrought by institutions operating beyond the reach of regulators and
dealing in products the regulators neither knew of nor understood have profound
implications. The hedge fund market remains largely unregulated. Furthermore, the
interaction between leverage, connectivity and system risk provides an overwhelming case
for its investigation.

XIII. EMBEDDEDNESS AND THE NEED FOR “NEW” REGULATION
As Colander et al observe, it is very likely that “...extreme leverage levels of interconnected
institutions will be found to impose unacceptable social risk on the public”54. This seems
evocative of Polanyi’s work55 on the concept of embeddedness, in challenging the idea of
the economy as an interlocking system of markets, automatically adjusting supply and
demand through the price mechanism. If taxpaying citizens are left with no alternative
other than to fund vast bank bailouts, fundamental issues of democratic accountability
arise. Reviewing Polanyi’s work from the vantage point of 2001, Stiglitz noted that the
“...freedom to move capital in and out of a country at will is a freedom that some exercise,
at enormous cost to others. Unfortunately, the self‐regulating economy ... does not
51
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represent a balancing of ... freedoms...”56 As O’Brien has written: “Embedding restraint has
become a policy priority for the entire regulatory community... in every major securities
market”57.

XIV. THE FUTURE: SOME FORECASTS
At a time of such great flux, it is difficult to predict how the regulation of the financial
markets may evolve over the next five years in response to the financial crisis. However, it
may be argued with some force that economics and the economics profession have failed to
provide society with proper insight into the workings of the modern financial system and
adequate warnings about the instruments it had created. The inability of conventional
economic theory even to envisage the current problems of the global financial system
requires that there must be a new approach to analysing the interconnectedness of
economic actors and the risks that this produces. This has profound implications for
regulatory “solutions” proffered by those who seem to focus upon the malign outcomes of a
sub‐prime system, rather than upon the composition and functioning of the system.
Network theory would appear to offer a preferable alternative to such analysis – and could
aid the effective implementation of reforms such as those proposed by Volcker – as it offers
the prospect of enabling regulators to determine what really is systemically important. The
international, interconnected nature of the market makes the network metaphor all the
more apposite. As Barabasi wrote a decade after the publication of his seminal work on
network analysis, “...many fads have come and gone ... one thing is increasingly clear:
Interconnectivity is so fundamental to the behaviour of complex systems that networks are
here to stay”58. The “easy” option is to enact new regulations intended to address the
outcomes of system dysfunction. In reality, the ability of the financial services industry to
devise new products means legislative measures resulting from the Volcker proposals may
be circumvented. The real and more challenging task is to devise regulatory responses
based on an understanding of how an evolving and multi‐faceted, interconnected system
actually functions.

56

Stiglitz, J., Forward, in: K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (2001, 2st ed. 1944), p xvi

57

O’Brien, Justin., Engineering a Financial Bloodbath, Imperial College Press (London) 2009, p 158

58

Barabasi, A‐L., Scale‐Free Networks: A Decade and Beyond, Science, Vol. 325, July 24th, 2009, p 413

15

APPENDIX:
A directed, weighted financial network in which there are five banks, with darker lines
corresponding to higher value links. This is an example of a simple, weighted, directed
network with five nodes.
From: Gai, P and Kapadia, S, Contagion in financial networks, Bank of England Working
Paper No. 383, p 11
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